The skippable ad format, commonly used by online content platforms, allows viewers to see a portion of an advertiser's message before having the option to skip directly to the intended content without viewing the entire advertisement. This paper examines the incentives of a platform to implement this ad format and the subsequent impact on the advertising market. Relative to the traditional ad format, we find that there are unambiguously more advertisements and viewers on the platform with skippable ads. Under reasonable conditions, the skippable ad is a strict Pareto improvement, which raises the surplus of advertisers and the profit of the platform. The source of this efficiency gain is that skippable ads allow the viewers to take advantage of their private information of their match value.
Introduction
As is becoming increasingly common on content platforms is the notion of the skippable advertisement (hereafter skippable ad). In a skippable ad, the viewer receives some brief information about the advertiser and then decides whether to continue viewing the ad or to move directly to the intended content. By moving directly to content, the viewer avoids the remaining portion of the ad. Consider, for instance, the video platform, YouTube, which implements the skippable ad format known as TrueView ads. Before a YouTube user can watch a video, he is often required to view the first part of an ad. After about 5 seconds of viewing the ad, the user has the option to "Skip Ad" and proceed directly to the desired video. YouTube is abandoning the traditional 30-second ad in lieu of shorter and skippable ads starting in 2018. 1 One defining aspect of the skippable ad is that the consumer receives some limited information about the advertiser's product and, after assessing that information, determines whether to pursue more information from the advertiser or to proceed with the intended task (e.g. watching a video). The novel feature of the skippable ad, relative to prior work, is the viewer's interaction with that initial information. Specifically, the viewer is forced to decide whether or not to continue attending to the ad based on her assessment from first part of it. Prior work in marketing and media economics has modeled advertising as an "all or nothing" endeavor. That is, the viewer either sees all ads or no ads (c.f. Anderson et al. 2015) . In the former, the consumer is assumed to see all ads provided by the platform, even though it imposes nuisance costs that detract from the content. In the latter, which has tended to focus on ad-avoidance technologies, a consumer initially commits to seeing no ads so that there is no possibility of assessing whether any particular ad contains relevant information.
The other defining aspect of the skippable ad in online settings is the ability of content platforms to attribute payments from advertisers based on the viewers engagement with the ad. For instance, YouTube does not charge advertisers if the viewer skips to the desired video before finishing the advertisement. This aspect distinguishes our setting from other forms of interactive advertising, such as a print ad in a magazine or traditional newspaper, in which payment attribution is not possible.
The skippable ad is more general than YouTube's TrueView format and is increasingly used by online and mobile content platforms. Some online news sites, for instance, deliver ads that intrude on content, but can be removed by clicking on an appropriate icon. Pop-ups on content sites ensure the reader sees some aspect of the ad, but the reader can choose whether to spend more time reading the ad or to close it and move on to the intended content. Even non-pop-up ads along the side of content give the viewer, known as the rollover or mouse-over ad, provides some initial information about the advertiser with the option to pursue more information by rolling the cursor over on the ad. As the use of this format increases, it is natural to ask Who benefits from skippable ads? And What are the implications of skippable ads for advertisers and publishers? Addressing these questions is the objective of this research.
A potential benefit of the skippable ad is that a consumer has more options, relative to 1 See "YouTube is Getting Rid of Unskippable 30-Second Ads" in Variety, February 17, 2017. traditional ads. Any consumer can view the entire ad, as with traditional ads, but now also has the option to skip to her content sooner, without watching the ad in full. Does this option hurt the advertiser's ability to convert a potential customer? Or, does it help the platform attract more potential customers for the advertiser? To address these questions, we examine the impact of the skippable ad format on advertising demand on the content platform. Specifically, we study the viewer's dynamic interaction with the information contained in the advertisement. Furthermore, we embed this interaction in a model of a two-sided market with a commercial platform selling skippable ads to advertisers, which are viewed by consumers interested in the platform's content. This model allows us to determine the impact of the skippable ad format on viewer participation on the platform and on the likelihood of viewer conversion (e.g. a purchase or favorable impression) as a result of the advertiser's message.
A key feature of our model is the dynamic interactions of the consumer with the skippable ad. We treat an advertisement as a series of informative signals about the advertiser's product (Branco et al. 2012 ). The consumer is obliged to receive one signal, which is used to assess the value of acquiring another signal. Not surprisingly, we find that a consumer will skip to the desired content (e.g. the video) by refusing a second signal whenever she expects the advertiser is not relevant for her. But we also find that a consumer may skip to content when she is more certain the product is relevant. As such, the advertiser need not pay for the ad even though the consumer values the advertiser's product.
Our model leads to a number of insights on skippable ads. First, we find that the introduction of skippable ads increases demand for the platform. Skippable ads give the consumer more flexibility about viewing an advertisement and the possibility of skipping to content when she believes the advertisement does provide decisive information. As a result, the consumers achieve higher utility from participating on the platform. We refer to this as the demand-enhancing effect of skippable ads. While the demand-enhancing effect provides a direct benefit to the platform, it also induces reactions in the advertising market. Specifically, with higher demand from viewers, the platform reduces its ad rate and sells to more advertisers. Consumers have a further, indirect, benefit from the increased advertising because they have a better chance of finding a relevant advertiser.
Second, relative to the traditional ad format, we find that the skippable ad changes how likely a viewer will be converted to an advertiser (e.g. make a purchase). We call this change the viewer conversion effect. Our model shows that the consequences of the viewer conversion effect depend crucially on the viewer's predisposition toward the advertiser. If a viewer is positively inclined toward the advertiser, then skippable ads raise the likelihood of conversion. A viewer predisposed to an advertiser is more willing to skip to her content because she is relatively certain that she likes the advertiser's product and does not need to wait for another signal. In this case, she can skip directly to her content without delay and the advertiser does not need to pay the platform. Interestingly, we find that the platform benefits in this case as well because it conditions its advertising rate to account for the viewer's expressed interest in receiving an additional signal. As a result, when the consumer's predisposition (or prior) toward the advertiser is positive, then skippable ads are a Pareto improvement over traditional ads.
This process works in reverse when the viewer has a negative prior for the advertiser. Even if the signal from the advertiser is encouraging, it may not be enough to overcome the viewer's prior or prevent her from skipping to the content. However, under traditional ads, the viewer must receive the second signal, which may be unexpectedly large and enough to convert her. Thus, the traditional ad format may be preferable by advertisers and the platform when consumers have a negative predisposition toward advertisers.
Prior work on commercial media and two-sided media markets has tended to treat consumers as passive in receiving information through advertising (e.g. . That is, consumers subjected to advertising are required to receive information from the advertiser, perhaps with some nuisance costs. Active attention to an advertisement and its detection by the platform implies fundamental differences in how ads are valued and sold. In particular, as we show, viewers who choose to receive more information about an advertiser are potentially more valuable to that advertiser. In prior work, any advertisement is assumed to intrude on content at some nuisance cost to the viewer (Dukes and Gal-Or 2003, Godes, Ofek, and Savary 2009, and Kaiser and Song 2009). Because we model the consumer's conscious decision to attend to the ad or not, we are able to identify a source of efficiency gains created by the skippable ad format, which has not been identified in prior work.
The ability of consumers to avoid an advertisement has traditionally been a worry for marketers. One reason marketers have been concerned about ad avoidance is that it confounds the advertiser's ability to communicate to consumers. For example, if a viewer is uninterested in an commercial, she can engage in behavioral skipping, such as leaving the room, socializing, or switching channels (known also as "zapping"). Prior work has examined the conditions affecting behavioral skipping and how to account for it when assessing advertising effectiveness Chattopadhyay 1998 and Wilbur et al. 2013) . Ad skipping in the context of interactive ads differs from behavioral skipping because (i) the consumer has the ability to avoid delay in accessing the desired content; and (ii) the content provider can charge the advertiser according to whether the ad was viewed or skipped. As we show, these two distinguishing features have new implications for viewers and advertisers. The inclination for some viewers to avoid advertising has inspired versioning options that include "ad-free" options, such as YouTube Red, and the creation of ad-avoidance technology (AAT), such as Tivo. Offer the consumer the option to pay for an ad-free option can be viewed as a form of quality segmentation via versioning (e.g. Halbheer et al. 2014) , which has been studied in the product-line design literature and, therefore, is not the focus of our work. More connected to our research, by contrast, is AAT, which is aimed at blocking ads entirely from commercial content. For example, digital video recorders (DVR's) allow the user to bypass all television advertisements and browser-based ad blockers eliminate all internet ads. Much of the research on AAT examines the consequences of such technology for advertisers and the content provider. This research suggests that AAT reduces the platform's advertising revenue and alters the composition of consumers. Furthermore, the technology induces the platform to increase advertising volumes, choose lower content quality and more mass-market content (e.g Wilbur 2008, Ghosh and Stock 2010, Gans 2011, and Johnson 2013) . Unlike with skippable ads, consumers employing AAT decide to skip all ads without considering whether any individual ad might be relevant. Consequently, with skippable ads, consumers make an informed choice about whether a particular ad is worth considering more seriously. This distinction implies that viewers have more individual control on what ads to watch and how advertisers are charged.
3 Consequently, and in contrast to the literature on AAT, we find that skippable ads can have benefits to both the platform and the advertisers.
Model Basics
We present a model of a two-sided market with consumers, or viewers, a monopoly platform, and a set of advertisers who wish to communicate with consumers through commercial advertisements on the platform. The timing evolves as follows. In period 0, the platform decides advertising rate and advertisers decide whether or not to show an advertisement on the platform. Consumers observe how many advertisements have been sold and then decide whether or not to join the platform and engage in content. In period 1, the consumer, if exposed to an ad, receives a noisy signal about a random advertiser's product. If the platform utilizes the skippable ad format, then the consumer decides whether to skip the rest of the ad. If she skips, then she enjoys content immediately. Otherwise, she decides to delay the content in order to acquire a second signal from that advertiser in period 2. After acquiring the second Teixeira et al. 2010). We do not consider strategic aspects of the advertiser to affect viewer attention to a commercial. 3 Recent work in economics and marketing study the mechanisms designed to improve attribution methods (Berman 2015, Lewis and Rao 2016) . While payment attribution is used with skippable ads, our research does not deeply explore its strategic implications for advertisers and platforms.
signal, viewer enjoys the content at end of period 2. At any point in this process, the consumer can decide to engage with the advertiser.
We are agnostic with regard to how the consumer engages with the advertiser. Specifically, we refer to a conversion process, which defines the point at which the advertiser obtains some value from the viewer's engagement. This can mean the viewer purchases the advertiser's product or simply that the viewer obtained a favorable impression of the advertiser. This approach allows us to consider a wide variety of motivations for advertising without specifying the details of how advertiser profits from consumer engagement.
We start with viewer behavior, which is the major component of our analysis. At the end of period 1, the viewer decides whether to skip the ad or continue receiving information. If the viewer skips ad and enjoys the content (e.g. watch video) right away, the viewer obtains a utility of w > 0. The value w is the same for all viewers. 4 If the viewer continues watching ad in period 2 (video is delayed until the end of period 2), then the value of watching content will be discounted to δw.
The true match value for a consumer/viewer, if converted by the advertising (e.g., purchasing the product), is v c ∼ N (µ, s 2 ). The mean µ is the consumer's prior on the value of the product, which can be positive or negative -a parameter that provides crucial conditions for our results. An ad is defined by two noisy signals about v c arriving sequentially and independently. The signals help inform the viewer about the value of engaging with the advertiser at some later time (e.g. seeing the advertised movie). Under the traditional ad format, the viewer must receive both signals. Under the skippable ad format, the viewer may skip signal v 2 but not the first signal v 1 . At the end of period 1, the viewer decides whether or not to skip to the desired content. If the viewer does not skip, then she receives the second signal v 2 in period 2.
Each signal v i is generated after watching period i = 1, 2 of the ad, with
where
We assume for simplicity that σ
An advertiser has a willingness to pay t for a viewer who converts. A interval of advertisers of measure 1 is distributed with CDF G(t) and density function g(t). We assume that G(t) is invertible on its support.
The platform chooses advertising rate r. This is the rate per viewer under traditional ads and the rate per non-skipping viewer under skippable ads. Note that under skippable ads, if the viewer skips ad, the advertiser will not pay to the platform for this viewer. In our model, when a viewer does not skip an ad, two things happen: (1) the viewer gets a second signal; (2) the viewer will have to wait for the requested video content so w is discounted. In practice, a viewer may become interested in the advertising content and click the advertiser link. In this case, the viewer will get more information about the advertiser (second signal), and the requested video will also be delayed. Therefore, clicking through an advertiser link is similar to our case of not skipping ads.
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In the next section, we analyze the viewer's interaction with a skippable ad. Specifically, we study the viewer's decision of whether to skip the ad and enjoy the intended content, or to wait for another signal v 2 . In Section 4, we then embed that model into the general two-sided market model with advertiser decisions. We then compare the equilibirum outcomes with the skippable ad format and the traditional ad format.
The Viewer Model: Interaction with the Skippable Ad
In this section, we study the viewer's decision of whether to skip the ad and enjoy the intended content or to accept the second signal and delay the consumption of content. Central to this decision is the expected value of the ad to the viewer conditional on receiving the first or on receiving both signals. The following result specifies both the distribution of viewer's value at the end of period 1 and a necessary and sufficient condition for the viewer to be converted.
(i) The sums v 1 + v 2 and ε 1 + ε 2 , conditional on v 1 , follow a joint normal distribution:
(ii) With two signals v 1 and v 2 , conversion is optimal for the viewer if and only if
5 Youtube charges the advertiser if the viewer watches the whole ad or clicks on the advertiser link.
Proof. See the Appendix for proofs of all formal claims.
Lemma 1 (i) establishes that the distribution of the advertiser's value to the viewer conditional on the information from the first part of the ad is normally distributed. This distribution features prominently in the subsequent analysis of the viewer's skipping decision.
The condition for viewer conversion in Lemma 1 (ii) says that, after receiving both signals, the viewer will convert with the advertiser exactly when the conditional mean of E(v c |v 1 , v 2 ) exceeds zero. As we see in Section 4, this condition also applies to the case of traditional ads because the viewer receives both signals. Finally, Lemma 1 shows that with a strong prior (e.g. µ >> 0), the viewer may be converted even if v 1 + v 2 < 0.
With skippable ads, the viewer can forego the information supplied by v 2 , thereby deciding whether or not to purchase the product with only one signal. The viewer can also watch the second period ad and then use both signals to make purchasing decisions. There are three options for her to consider.
The first two options involve the viewer skipping the second part of the ad after getting the first signal v 1 . If she converts, her expected utility as a function of her first signal v 1 is
If she does not convert, her utility is simply
which is the utility gained by directly viewing the desired content and not engaging with the advertiser. This value is independent of her first signal.
A third option for the viewer is to continue watching the ad, obtain another signal v 2 , and then decide whether or not to buy. Once the viewer receives the second signal, the optimal conversion decision is given in Lemma 1 (ii). The corresponding expected utility is
As is evident from this expression, the viewer's expected value of the advertised product conditional on v 1 has a truncated Normal distribution. This truncation distribution is defined by the condition in Lemma 1 where the viewer assesses whether, upon receiving the second signal v 2 , the signals' sum will exceed the purchase threshold −µ σ 2 s 2 . The endowed properties of the Normally distributed signals imply we can derive a closed form expression for the viewer's utility from viewing the second part of the ad.
Lemma 2 The viewer's expected utility of viewing the second part of the ad is
with A, B and C given in Lemma 1 and φ(·) and Φ(·) are the pdf and CDF of standard normal distribution. Furthermore, U are the expected value of the advertiser's product, conditioned on it being acceptable to the viewer. The variable α is the standardized expression for the first signal v 1 , which accounts for the truncation cutoff −µ σ 2 s 2 . An important property of (3) is that it strictly increases with v 1 . As the value of the first signal increases, the viewer's updated disposition toward conversion becomes more favorable. As a result, conversion becomes more likely and valuable, and the viewer's expected utility after receiving the second signal (as dictated by option 3) increases.
Lemma 2 also describes several comparative properties of U only once, in the form of δw. As either parameter increases, the viewer has greater benefit from skipping to her content. Part (ii) indicates that a higher prior on the advertiser makes it more valuable to the viewer to be correct in assessing whether to convert. Part (iii-a) expresses that, for a positive prior on the advertiser, the viewer's benefit from waiting for the second signal is increasing in the variance of the true, latent, value of the advertiser. As s increases, signals become relatively more informative, which raises the benefit of the second signal v 2 . Part (iii-b) indicates that the degree of signal noise σ raises the informative value of the second signal, but only if the first signal v 1 was not very strong relative to the prior. The characterization of U and v 1 = v L , v H as solutions to each equation, respectively. In order to derive meaningful solutions to these equations, we impose the following condition:
This assumption simply states that, for the "average" first signal, the viewer prefers to continue watching the ad. As indicated in the following result, it assures us that v L and v H have meaningful interpretations. each exactly once. This is because,
The intuition is as follows. v 1 and v c are positively correlated. Having a higher v 1 implies on average a larger v c which would improve the value of purchasing the product. Having a second signal will not change this. Thus we have , the viewer has only one signal and buys the product. In contrast, in U skip 3
, there are two signals. The second signal v 2 is positively correlated to v 1 but only imperfectly. Furthermore, the viewer has the option to not purchase the product in which case having lower v 1 and v 2 won't affect the viewer utility.
The definitions of v L and v H and Lemma 3 imply the following result.
Proposition 1 Under the skippable ads format, after a viewer obtains the first signal v 1 , the viewer's optimal viewing decision is characterized as follows:
the viewer skips the ad and does not convert;
(ii) If v 1 ≥ v H , the viewer skips the ad and converts;
, the viewer continues viewing the ad to obtain another signal v 2 , and converts if and only if
Proposition 1 fully specifies the viewer's reaction to the first signal v 1 . Furthermore, it shows the probability of each option being chosen. The viewer will skip the second part of the ad for large and small values of v 1 . In these situations, the viewer is relatively certain that another signal will not be decisive in changing her mind about converting. For intermediate values of v 1 , the viewer seeks another signal from the advertiser to become better informed about making her conversion decision. The opportunity cost of acquiring another signal is the delay in viewing her desired content, (1 − δ)w.
Next, we want to explore how v L and v H vary with the parameters. It turns out that v L and v H are closely tied as follows.
Proposition 2
The cutoff values v L and v H have the following properties.
(ii) v L decreases with µ, δ, increases with w, but can increase or decrease with s and σ.
(iii) v H decreases with µ, w, increases with δ, but can increase or decrease with s and σ.
Intuitively, v L and v H are determined by the consideration of the benefit and cost of having the second signal. The cost is the discounting of w, (1 − δ)w. Now let us consider the benefit, starting with σ. First, suppose that σ → 0+. Then signals are accurate which implies that the second signal is mostly a repetition of the first signal. Therefore, there is little gain from waiting for the second signal. Next, suppose that σ → +∞. In this case the signal is uninformative, and consequently an additional signal adds little value. It is easy to see that when σ is some intermediate ranges, the value of the second signal will be higher.
Comparing Traditional and Skippable Ads
Our objective is to determine how the skippable ad format affects viewers, the content platform, and advertisers. We use the traditional format as the benchmark. Implementing the traditional format in our model is to assume that the viewer is obligated to receive both signals from the advertiser. This is equivalent to option 3 under skippable ads, that is,
where the U skip 3
expression is given earlier in equation (3).
Any impact on advertisers is a consequence of how viewers react to the skippable ad format. Therefore, we start our comparison by examining how skippable ads affect viewer decisions using the model developed above. There are two effects. First, the type of ad format affects the utility a potential viewer obtains from joining the platform. Consequently, a platform that switches to the skippable ad format can induce more viewers on the platform and thereby increase the reach of an advertiser. We call this effect the demand enhancing effect. Second, the type of ad format affects the consumers' expected benefit from the advertiser's product or service. We use model described above to assess the degree to which consumers are more or less likely to convert to the advertiser, which we call the viewer conversion effect. Obviously, any change in the viewer conversion rate will affect the demand for advertising on the platform. We start with the impact on viewer conversion.
Viewer Conversion
We first compare viewer conversion rate under traditional ads and skippable ads respectively. Recall that viewer's ad skipping decision depends on the single signal v 1 and how it compares to v L and v H . This defines three conditions as follows:
The viewer conversion condition, in the presence of two signals, defines two more conditions:
The conditions above are graphically depicted in Figure 2 . The conditions for skipping behavior, C 1a , C 1,b , and C 1c , are depicted by the sets partitioning all realizations of the first signal v 1 . These are represented by the vertical strips to the right of v H (C 1c ), to the left of v L , (C 1a ), and in between v L and v H , (C 1b ). The conditions for conversion with two signals are depicted by the upper and lower planes defined by the diagonal line
and C 2b , respectively). Denote by V CR trad = P r(C 2a ) the viewer conversion rate conditional on seeing a traditional ad and by V CR skip the viewer conversion rate conditional on seeing a skippable ad as
Moving from traditional ads to skippable ads, there is gain in viewer conversion rate when v 1 ≥ v H . Under skippable ads, the viewer will skip ad and buy the product. Under traditional ads, however, the viewer may decide not to buy the product after getting the second signal. By contrast, when v 1 ≤ v L , traditional ads can lead to a purchase that would never happen under a skippable ad. Specifically, with traditional ads, the viewer may obtain a very large value of v 2 that more than offsets the low initial signal. The two impacts of the skippable ad format on viewer conversion can be seen graphically in Figure 2 . The shaded region in upper portion of the figure is the loss in conversion due to skippable ads. In this region, a viewer would have converted in a traditional ad because she received a very large second signal that offsets her pessimistic first signal (v 1 < v L ). The shaded region in the lower portion of the figure is the gain in conversion due to skippable ads. In this region, the viewer is converted immediately due to the strong first signal (v 1 > v H ) without having to waiting for the second signal, which might be sufficiently negative to make her unfavorable to the advertiser. As the following proposition establishes, the relative strength of these two impacts is precisely determined by the viewer's prior belief of an advertiser's product.
Proposition 3 (Viewer Conversion) V CR
skip − V CR trad has the same sign as the viewer's prior µ. Therefore, relative to traditional ads, viewer conversion is more likely under skippable ads if and only if µ > 0.
The condition µ > 0 means that consumers are predisposed toward purchasing the product. If there were no signal, then all will be converted. Having a signal actually will reduce sales, and having more signals will reduce sales further. Under skippable ads, consumers may decide to have only one signal while under traditional ads consumers always view two signals. The opposite is the case for when µ < 0. This intuition is consistent with the consumer information search problem studied in Branco et al. (2012) .
Platform Participation by Viewers
Next, we characterize viewer's platform participation decision under each ad format. We determine the measure of viewers who will join the platform and in turn be reached by advertisers. For now, fix the measure of advertisers who will advertise on the platform and denote it by N > 0. Let h(N ) denote the probability of each viewer seeing an ad. We restrict h(N ) < 1 and rule out the possibility that a viewer may see more than one ad.
Under traditional ads, the marginal consumer d, which also represents the demand for the platform, is determined by
is the expected utility of the viewer conditional on her seeing a traditional ad.
Similarly, under skippable ads, the marginal consumer d is determined by
is the expected utility of the viewer conditional on seeing a skippable ad.
We assume that consumers have the option of not joining the platform and obtaining zero utility. Furthermore, consumers are characterized by their value of d, uniformly distributed on the interval [0,d] with density 1. We can then derive platform demand under the two different ad regimes:
A comparison of (6) and (7) gives us that U skip ad > U trad ad and, therefore, the ranking of (8) and (9) for fixed N .
Lemma 4 (Direct Demand-Enhancing Effect) For any fixed
Skippable ads are unambiguously beneficial for consumers because they give control to the viewer in what ads they see and do not see. In particular, viewers can avoid delay in accessing the desired content when it is unlikely that the advertiser will be relevant. We refer to it as the direct demand-enhancing effect because the result is obtained under the condition that N is the same under the two ad formats. The condition that N is constant is equivalent to assuming that the advertising market does not react to a switch in the advertising regime. This is addressed in the next section.
Before moving to the analysis of the advertising market, it is worthwhile to recognize how the volume of ads N affects viewer participation. This can be seen in (8) and (9) through the marginal impact of N . On the negative side, from the first terms, an increase in ad volume reduces viewing benefits because it makes it more likely that the viewer will be delayed in reaching the desired content. This represents a nuisance cost because the marginal impact of N reduces platform demand. (Our model thus provides some micro-foundations for "advertising as a nuisance" seen in the prior work on media economics cited earlier.) The second terms reflect a positive impact because ads may connect a viewer with a valuable advertiser. These two impacts play an important role in the platform's optimal advertising choice.
Impact on the Advertising Market
We consider reactions on the advertising side of the platform. Recall from Section 2, each advertiser is characterized by a t > 0, which represents the value of a conversion. The distribution of advertisers is described by the cdf G(t), which has density G (t) = g(t)
. Therefore, the advertising rate as a function of the number of advertisers is
Because V CR trad is independent of r and N , and G (or G −1 ) is monotonic, there is a one-toone correspondence between r and N . For simplicity, we assume that the platform chooses N instead of r. Then platform's problem is to choose N to maximizes its expected advertising profit (assuming zero cost):
With skippable ads the advertiser needs to pay only when the viewer does not skip, which occurs with probability P r(C 1b ). Advertiser t advertises if and only if t·V CR skip ≥ r·P r(C 1b ).
Therefore, the threshold for advertiser participation is t ≥ t skip ≡ r·P r(C 1b )
V CR skip , which defines an advertiser demand facing the platform N = 1 − G(t skip ). The corresponding advertising rate for skippable ads is then
The platform's problem with skippable ads is to choose N to maximizes its expected advertising profit
The advertising rate r skip under skippable ads is the advertising rate per non-skipping viewer. On a per platform viewer basis, the advertising rate is P r(C 1b ) · r skip . Thus, the direct impact of skippable ads on per viewer ad rates, holding viewer participation constant is
Thus, the direct impact of skippable ads on advertising rate is determined precisely by the sign of µ, as determined by the viewer conversion effect in Proposition 2.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of skippable ads on the equilibirum levels of advertisers, viewers, and the total number of advertisements shown on the platform.
Proposition 4
(ii) more viewers on the platform,
This result says generally that skippable ads generate more activity on the platform, relative to traditional ads. The platform attracts more advertisers (part (i)). Part (ii) shows that viewers benefit further from this because they have a better chance of seeing a relevant ad.
is what we refer to as indirect demand enhancing effect of skippable ads. To see this, recall from (6) and (7) 
Impact on Profits
The above results make clear that skippable ads have direct and indirect benefits to viewers. What has not been evaluated is the impact of skippable ads on the platform's profit and advertisers' surplus. As we show in this section, switching to the skippable ad format can have positive and negative impacts on advertisers and the platform. To better understand these opposing impacts, we decompose the demand-enhancing and the viewer conversion effects.
• Viewer Conversion Effect: Viewer conversion rate is higher (lower) under skippable ads if and only if µ > 0 (µ < 0).
• Demand-Enhancing Effect: As long as d trad <d, the platform has unambiguously more viewers with skippable ads.
-Direct impact: the option to skip ads directly raises viewer's utility from the platform, which leads to greater participation.
-Indirect impact: the direct impact implies that the platform adjusts its advertising rate to induce more advertiser participation, which induces further viewer participation.
For ad regime i ∈ {skip, trad}, earlier we have shown that platform profit is given by
Next, we show that aggregate advertiser surplus is given by
Starting with traditional ads,
Similarly, aggregate advertiser surplus under skippable ads is
First suppose that there is no demand-enhancing effect. That is, assume d trad =d so that the change in ad regimes has no impact on the number of advertisers: N skip = N trad and t trad = t true . By Proposition 3 we immediately have the following lemma. When the demand-enhancing effect is off, the viewer conversion effect completely determines the impact on advertisers and the platform. Recall that when µ > 0, skippable ads are more likely to induce conversion with the first signal. Advertisers are thus better off and the platform can sell more ads. When µ < 0, this logic implies reduced advertiser surplus and platform profit. In either case, when there is no demand-enhancing effect, Lemma 5 implies the platform's incentive for implementing skippable ads is perfectly aligned with advertisers.
We now turn to the more nuanced case in which the demand-enhancing effect is active. To understand these nuances, we shut down the viewer conversion effect by setting µ = 0. Then, by Proposition 3, the viewer conversion rate is the same under the two ad formats (V CR trad = V CR skip ). We know from Proposition 4, part (ii) that it is optimal for the platform to raise ad levels under the skippable regime. Specifically, the optimizations in (11) and (13) imply
so that the marginal return to advertising volume is higher under the skippable ad regime due to the demand-enhancing effect. Hence, π skip P > π trad P for µ = 0.
To understand how changes in the market setting affect aggregate advertiser surplus, we look into equation (15) . We know that V CR trad = V CR skip and N ) is the marginal advertiser. The impact of a marginal advertiser on aggregate advertiser surplus is calculated by the following derivative,
The expression above provides a decomposition of the three effects when N (and t i ) changes slightly. This occurs when the advertising rate changes. When t i goes down slightly, more advertisers will advertise on the platform. These new advertisers will earn positive surplus, captured by the first term. These advertisers are at the margin and impact goes toward zero for an infinitesimal change in t i . Lower t i also indicates a lower advertising rate so existing advertisers pay less for advertising, an effect captured by the second term. The third term is more subtle. Advertisers need to compete with each other for the ad spots. If h(N ) only increases slightly when N increases, ads from the marginal advertisers will crowd out some of the ads from existing advertisers. Since marginal advertisers have lower t values than existing advertisers, this crowd-out effect will hurt the advertisers as a whole. The condition in part (ii) of this lemma is a sufficient condition for improved advertiser surplus when the platform implements skippable ads. Thus, under this condition, the platform's incentive for switching to skippable ads is aligned with advertiser's interests when µ = 0. We are unable to establish this alignment outside of the condition in part (ii) of Lemma 6.
As is evident in Lemmas 5 and 6, there are broad conditions under which the platform will implement skippable ads precisely when it is beneficial for advertisers. This is a reasonable outcome given that the platform collects no direct fees from viewers. All revenue for the platform come from the advertiser-side. Prior work in media economics notes how more viewer benefits lead to higher demand for the platform and, consequently, more advertising revenue. This is the result in Lemma 6. What is new for skippable ads relative to that prior work is seen in Lemma 5. It says that the ad format benefits advertisers by helping them convert viewers better, thus raising the share of the platform's revenue.
Combining the results in the two lemmas above, we deduce the general results in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose the platform switches from traditional ads to skippable ads.
(i) If µ > 0, then the platform earns more profits and aggregate advertiser surplus increases. The skippable ad format is a Pareto improvement over the traditional format.
(ii) Suppose µ < 0 and the demand-enhancing effect is sufficiently small (d i ↑d). Then advertisers and the platform are worse off with skippable ads.
(iii) Suppose µ < 0 and the viewer conversion effect is sufficiently small (µ → 0 − ). Then advertisers and the platform are better off with skippable ads.
This general result implies that unless the demand-enhancing effect is small, the skippable ad format is an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, the availability of skippable ad technology leads to a Pareto improvement over the traditional format. Because skippable ads lead to a better viewer experience, the increased viewership is a benefit to advertisers and the platform.
Conclusion
The growing use of interactive advertising on mobile and online content platforms is changing the way viewers acquire information about products and services. The skippable ad format, in particular, seems to make up a large part of the interactive advertising category and is used by YouTube and many online news sites. This paper examined the skippable ad and focused on the viewer's interaction with this format.
The fact that viewers decide how much of the advertiser's information to acquire in a skippable ad is fundamentally different than in the traditional ad format seen in conventional media. Another distinctive feature of this ad format is that platforms can charge advertisers only when viewers see the entire ad. As we argued, these distinctions have important implications on the demand for advertising.
We constructed a model of the viewer's sequential interaction with advertiser's information when deciding whether to continue watching an ad or to skip. This model showed us that a viewer watches more of the advertisement when she expects the subsequent information to be helpful in making a decision about the advertiser. If she is relatively certain about the advertiser, positively or negatively, then she can move on to her desired content without the cost of delay. We embedded this model into a two-sided market with a platform selling advertisers access to viewers. We found that, relative to the traditional ad format, the use of skippable ads leads to more viewers on the platform. With more viewers under the skippable ad, the platform sells advertising to more advertisers. Under certain conditions, the movement from the traditional to the skippable ad format is a Pareto improvement. The source of the efficiency is that the skippable ad guides the viewer to more meaningful information relative to her preferences. As a result, she obtains direct benefit from participating on the platform. When viewers are predisposed to advertised products, then advertisers are more likely to convert viewers because viewers skip more often and are less likely, relative to traditional ads, to receive information that reverses their prior. Platforms subsequently benefit from higher advertising demand. This paper has focused on a representative viewer and her interaction with the skippable ad. This approach afforded us the ability to build a detailed model of the viewer's information processing and skipping decision. However, it restricted our ability to examine how viewer heterogeniety affects the platform's strategy vis-á-vis the advertising market. Furthermore, we were also unable to draw out more detailed implications for advertising strategies. For instance, if an advertiser pays only for ads that are watched in entirety, then an advertiser may strategically modify its message sequencing or the content of the initial signal relative to traditional ads. Finally, we were unable to study the optimal dynamics of ad placement when it can occur outside of the first part of the content (e.g. Zhou 2003) . We hope that all of these issues can be undertaken in future research.
Appendix
In order to prove the results in the main text, it is first helpful to have the following intermediate result.
The last row and column inΣ indicate the position of the random variables, and are not part of the covariance matrix.
Proof of Lemma 7
The 5 random variables associated with the advertising signals are jointly distributed normally, as follows:
Note that Σ 22 = s 2 + σ 2 , and Σ 11 is the 4 × 4 matrix obtained by deleting the last row and column in Σ.
Substituting the covariance matrix, we havē
The last row and column indicate the position of the random variables, and are not part of the covariance matrix. Note that the conditional covariance matrix is independent of µ.
Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Derive the joint distribution of v 1 + v 2 and ε 1 + ε 2 , conditional on v 1 . We divide the analysis into 3 steps.
Step 1: Calculate the conditional distribution ε 1 + ε 2 | v 1 ε 1 + ε 2 |v 1 is joint normal with mean
and variance
Step 2: Calculate the conditional distribution
Similarly, v 1 + v 2 |v 1 is joint normal with mean
with B 2 defined earlier. Note that µ enters the A term but not the B 2 term.
Step 3: Calculate the conditional covariance
There are 6 terms in the covariance expression above:
• The 1st term is
• The 2nd term is
The 3rd term and the 6th term cancel out.
• The 4th term is
based on our earlier derivations.
• The 5th term is zero.
The covariance term is then
Combined, the conditional joint distribution is
where A, B 2 , C and ∆ are specified in Lemma 1.
(ii) Derive the distribution of v c conditional on v 1 and v 2 .
We have the following joint distribution:
The conditional mean of v c given v 1 and v 2 is
Conversion is optimal for the viewer if and only if
Proof of Lemma 2
The first component of (16) is calculated as follows.
is the expectation in the case of one-sided truncation and it equals (see Wikipedia Truncated normal one-sided truncation of lower tail https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truncated_normal_ distribution.)
, where A and B 2 are defined in Lemma 1 and
Previously we have shown that (v 1 + v 2 )|v 1 follows Normal distribution with mean A and variance B 2 . Thus
The first component of (16) is then
To calculate the second component of (16), recall the conditional joint distribution is
.
This comes from the link https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multivariate_normal_distribution# Bivariate_conditional_expectation.
Then, the second component of (16) becomes
Substituting this into the U skip 3 expression, we can obtain
The U skip 3 expression can be simplified to that in (3). We now establish the comparative static properties of U (ii) Consider any two µ values of a and b with b > a. We transform a series of variables as follows:
This transformation increases the conditional means of v 2 , v c and ε 1 , but not the conditional mean of ε 2 or the whole conditional variance/covariance matrix. Thus, the following two conditional random vectors are equal in distribution:
The first = follows from the equality of the original and transformed distributions. The first inequality holds because v c < v c and the second due to viewer optimality. This establishes that U skip 3 increases in µ.
(iii) We now show that U skip 3 is non-monotonic in s and δ. Using the U skip 3 (v 1 ) expression, taking derivative and simplifying, we can obtain, sign ∂U
(µσ 2 +v 1 s 2 ) 2 (2s 2 +σ 2 ) σ 2 s 4 (s 2 +σ 2 )
Note that Ψ 1 > 0 and Ψ 3 > 0. For Ψ 2 , where erf (x) is the Gauss error function, it is positive if and only if the argument is positive. Thus, Ψ 2 > 0 iff µσ 2 + v 1 s 2 > 0, or simply 
Proof of Lemma 3
We first show the existence and uniqueness of v L and v H and then establish their ordering.
Existence. This is established using the continuity of U skip i
(v 1 ) in v 1 , for i = 1, 2 and 3 as well as the fact that U
which holds because α → +∞ implies 1 − Φ(α) → 0 and φ(α) → 0. Similarly,
which holds because α → −∞ implies 1 − Φ(α) = 1 and φ(α) = 0. Therefore, by continuity of
Uniqueness. A sufficient condition for single-crossing is the condition in (4). It is straightforward to see ∂U
We now show that ∂U
We do this by showing that U skip 3
(v 1 = a) must hold for any b > a. Note that an increase of v 1 from a to b increases the conditional mean of v 1 , v 2 , v c and ε 1 , but not the conditional mean of ε 2 or the whole conditional variance/covariance matrix. Define a set of new variables using the following transformation:
Then the following two conditional distributions are exactly the same:
Therefore,
The first = follows from the equality of the original and transformed distributions. The first inequality holds because v c < v c and the second due to viewer optimality. Because a < b are arbitrary, we have U If we ignore the discounting of w, then U skip 1
is the same as getting the second signal but always buys the product anyway (i.e., not using either signal). That is
Then the condition
Consider again the transformation of (v 1 , v 2 , v c , ε 1 , ε 2 |v 1 = a) from above with a > b.
We need to show that Λ(
We now explain this chain of conditions. The second equality follows from the equivalence of distributions. The next equality is a simple decomposition on complementary conditional events:
s 2 is negative. To see this, consider a tighter conditional event:
Therefore, conditioning on
s 2 , makes this expectation negative. The subsequent equality follows from the redundancy of the conditioning events. That is, 
The proof of (i) is completed by establishing the (18) . Recall the definition of v L is the solution to U 
Taking total differentiation, we have 
Using the U skip 3 expression in (3), we have
so that (19) can be expanded as follows:
We show that the second and third bracketed terms are each zero when
The second term is simplified by noting the following facts: φ(α|v L ) = φ(α|v H ) and
The latter fact is verified directly by differentiating A and we know φ(α|v L ) = φ(α|v H ) because of the symmetry implied by
These simplifications imply that the second term in (20) is zero if and only if
Evaluating the LHS of the above condition gives
which is zero precisely when v L + v H = −2µ · Give that the second and third terms of (20) are zero, the condition in (19) is finally established as follow.
The second equality is because
So equation (19) holds, and Similarly,
The signs of 
where erf (z) is an error function and always less than 1 (converges to 1 when z → +∞). Therefore, the numerator is negative. The denominator, Similarly, 
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to evaluate V CR skip − V CR trad , we make the following simplification:
The first term above represents the Gain in viewer conversion, while the second the Loss. Hence,
where f 1 (v 1 ) is the density function of v 1 and X ≡ −µ · σ 2 s 2 . Similarly,
Using the above simplification, we establish the proposition's claim as follows. We first show that Gain = Loss at δ = 1. Then we show that Gain − Loss is strictly monotone in δ ∈ (0, 1). Specifically, we show that Gain − Loss is strictly increasing (decreasing) when µ < 0 (µ > 0). The proposition's claim is immediately established once we have shown this monotonicity property.
Step 1: δ → 1 ⇒ Gain − Loss → 0 If δ → 1, then there is no cost for the viewer to wait for the second signal. Therefore, no viewer will ever skip ad, regardless of their
Therefore, viewer conversion rate must be the same under traditional and skippable ads, and Gain − Loss → 0.
Step 2:
and µ have opposite signs.
To evaluate this derivative, we exploit the results of Lemma A, which established that v 2 |v 1 follows normal distribution with a mean Θ(v 1 ) = µ+ s 2 s 2 +σ 2 (v 1 −µ), and variance Γ 2 = σ 2 (2s 2 +σ 2 ) s 2 +σ 2 . This yields the following simplification of the integrands in (21) and (22):
The fourth line above follows from the fact v L + v H = 2X (by Proposition 2) and the symmetry property Φ(x) = 1 − Φ(−x). The last step can be replicated by expanding P r(
The above simplification enables the following derivation:
The '−' sign in front of dv H dδ is because v H is in the lower bound of the integral in (21). Note also that the P r(·) and f 1 (·) terms in (21) and (22) are independent of δ. The above derivation also employs the fact that
(implied by Proposition 2). Hence, the above derivative has the same sign as that of
fully determines the sign of the derivative above. The density f 1 (v 1 ) is normal and therefore centered around and peaked at v 1 = µ. Thus, Next suppose µ > 0. In this case, v L + v H = 2X < 0, which implies v L < v H and therefore
Therefore, f 1 (v H ) > f 1 (v L ) which establishes that d(Gain−Loss) dδ < 0, ∀δ < 1. As δ → 1, Gain − Loss > 0 decreases from above and converges to zero. In other words, it must be that V CR skip −V CR trad > 0, ∀δ < 1. The case of µ < 0 analogously implies V CR skip −V CR trad < 0, ∀δ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
To establish (i) and (ii), we evaluate the optimization conditions implied by (11) and (13) . Noting that V CR i is independent of of N for i ∈ {skip, trad}, we know that N i maximizes:
We first establish that neither N i = 0 or 1 can be optimal for the platform. Obviously, N = 0 leads to zero profit. Assume that zero is the greatest lower bound for the support of t. To have N = 1, the advertising rate must be zero, leading to zero profit as well. Hence, we have N i ∈ (0, 1), for i ∈ {skip, trad}. Therefore, any interior maximizer N i solves
where u = U i ad is given by (6) and (7) and the arguments of G, h, and h have been dropped for notational convenience. Even though for skippable ads, u > w always holds, for traditional ads, u < w is possible. Therefore, we must consider all possible orderings of u and w. First consider the case of u = w. Then the term in the first square brackets of (23) must be zero. Then the claim holds immediately.
Next, consider the case of u > w. The two terms in the two square brackets above must have opposite signs. With G −1 and h h both being positive, it must be that dG −1 dN < 0. In turn, we must have the first square bracket term being negative and the second positive. That is,
Finally, assume that u < w. Rearranging the (23), we have
It should be clear from the above that the two square bracketed terms have the same sign (and cannot be zero). And because h ∈ (0, 1) and u < w, h · w > h 2 · (w − u) > 0 must hold.
Then the absolute value of the first square bracketed term must be smaller than the absolute value of the second one. Suppose that both of these terms were negative. Since G −1 h h > 0, it must be that,
That is, the absolute value of the first square bracketed term must be smaller than the absolute value of the second one, a violation. Hence the claim is established.
Using the above claim, we now prove (i) by evaluating Second-order condition for maximization requires that the denominator is negative. Recall that
which is positive because of the claim established above. Hence, 
Proof of Lemma 5
With no demand-enhancing effect, d skip = d trad , which further implies N skip = N trad and t skip = t trad . This simplifies the comparisons of π i P and Π i A , for i ∈ {skip, trad}, given in (14) and (15):
and for advertisers' surplus
The impacts of skippable ads on platform profits and advertisers' surplus are precisely determined by V CR skip − V CR trad , which is given in Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 6
Assuming µ = 0 means that V CR skip = V CR 
is positive because both terms are negative. In particular, the first term (curly bracketed) is zero minus a positive integral, and 
